Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has retained special attention as a Eurasian country with a defining role in the evolution of the former-soviet space. We argue here that the issue of Russian evolution under Putin's leadership has raised specific questions in the security realm, potentially affecting the entire post-soviet space and the European security architecture. This paper aims at, firstly, exploring geopolitics as a contributing perspective to this issue and, secondly, shedding some light on the role of normative (non-)convergence in explaining Russian external action. The paper will pay special attention to new modes of cooperation and competition that Moscow has developed with the US and the EU in the 2000's. Finally, the paper assesses how the strategic approach is complementary to the normative perspective in understanding current challenges.
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, after both the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the literature has attempted to organise the countries of this "space" in different categories that explain their internal and external orientations. In this context, the Russian Federation has retained special attention as a Eurasian country still occupying, and wanting to occupy, a defining role in the evolution of the former Soviet bloc. Moscow, as the main successor state of the former Soviet Union, is a strategic player in a direct or indirect way.
Russian geopolitics have been a main contributing field to understand the renewed role of the former superpower in Europe, particularly as far as the analysis of its vast natural resources and its nuclear and conventional armament are concerned. 2 These two dimensions of power have been instrumental in Russian relations with the European Union (EU), the United States (US), European security institutions such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and neighbouring countries. Besides the fact that both dimensions are material dimensions of power, they also refer to power viewed from a spatial perspective and, thus, explain Russian foreign policy from a geopolitical gaze.
We do not aim here at reviewing critical geopolitics literature as a perspective for the analysis of international security 3 but at evidencing how this view contributes to enlighten core dimensions of the Russian rationales in the security realm. As Dalby (2009) underlines, geopolitics implies a broad perspective on the relationship between space and power, i.e. " […] a term that refers to numerous modes of linking space and power and is best left that way; it's a discursive mode, a matter of overlapping discursive practices, not a thing to be reduced to a stable definition". In that sense, the role of ideas and perceptions, besides traditional strategic interests, is also instrumental to understand Russian positioning towards security issues in Europe. 4 The definition of what constitutes the European security architecture has evolved since the end of the cold war in accordance with the redefinition of strategic and normative relations, as it is argued in this paper. It is constituted by security institutions (with different roles, importance and scope), bilateral treaties between the US and Russia, and the main Euro-Atlantic security actors (the EU, Russia and the US). The peculiarity of the architecture is its ongoing adaptation to the post-cold war period and the recurring Russian contestation of the role of NATO in Europe. Despite an apparent status quo concerning its adaptation in the 1990s, such as NATO enlargement or the OSCE pan-European scope, the new millennium has brought increasing challenges to its foundations.
In order to understand the impact of Russia in the security realm, this paper will, thus, analyse two intertwined dimensions that inform Russian positions: (1) strategic interests and (2) issues of political convergence based on the normative assumptions underpinning the relations of Moscow with third parties. The latter is particularly sensitive as it relates to a growing gap between Moscow and its Euro-Atlantic counterparts concerning issues such as secessionism, among others central to the European security order. The paper will pay special attention to new modes of cooperation and competition that Moscow has developed with the US and the EU from 2000 to 2012, with some views on more recent developments. This period corresponds to Putin's leadership of the country and to significant shifts in its foreign and security policy in a course of reassertion.
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In the first part, we will analyse how arms control and energy management are pursued by Russia as core strategic interests to create an improved power position. In the second part, the paper explores how Russian multilateral relations demonstrate that the spreading of values and norms in cooperative relations impacts on Russian perceived positioning. The emphasis will, thus, be placed on immaterial aspects of power in contrast with material instruments (military and economic) and how the multilateral relationships of Russia form a loose commitment towards common norms. The conclusion synthesizes how the second category (ideational dimension) is complementary to the first to understand the fact that the security relations between Russia and the other security actors (the EU, the US and international organizations) have been deteriorating.
ARMS CONTROL AND ENERGY: TWO DRIVERS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC REASSERTION

ARMS CONTROL AND RUSSIAN DETERRENCE CAPACITIES
Putin's Russia has voiced divergent views from its Euro-Atlantic counterparts on an array of security issues, ranging from the so-called "common neighbourhood" illustrates Russia's own interpretation of stability and sovereignty in Europe, leading the EU and the US to condemn the Russian military 5 On the evolution of Russian foreign and security policy and Putin's Russia empowerment, see Haas, 2010 and Piet, 2014. 6 Geographically, the "common neighbourhood" includes the countries of the "near abroad" or the "postSoviet space". The first reflects the enlarged EU's view of its external role on the borders that comprise a shared neighbourhood with Russia on the Eastern flank of the EU. The expression refers, thus, to a geopolitical perspective of engagement of the EU in this space. The "near abroad" comprehends the fourteen Newly Independent States which integrated the former Soviet Union. This zone of vital interest, or at least sphere of influence, is fundamental to the Russian perception of threats. The Russian "near abroad" (blizhneyezarubezhye, in Russian) is attributed to Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs under Yeltsin (de Tinguy, 2008: 57-59) . 7 A few days before the November 2013 Vilnius summit, Ukraine decided to suspend temporarily the preparations for signing two agreements that would have been a milestone for the country's relationship with the EU. The summit was the third of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), an EU policy launched in 2009 to tighten Brussels' offers towards its Eastern neighbours. From then onwards, the country faces an internal crisis with international consequences. The EU has adopted several rounds of sanctions to protest against what it considers the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea of March 2014 and military backing of East Ukrainian separatists. Nonetheless, the extension of asset freezes and visa bans and the eventual trade restrictions on Crimea do not target Putin's inner circle, Russian access to financial markets or even sensitive sectors of the Russian economy. Currently, Ukrainian sovereignty is still threatened by separatism although it ratified an Association Agreement with the EU. escalation as a response to the crisis in Ukraine. The use of military moves has been a recurrent Russian reaction in crisis contexts in Europe. For instance, in 2013, the Kremlin stationed Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad (at the border of the EU) in response to the US/NATO planned antimissile shield (Gutterman, 2013) . With similar political symbolism, Russia launched a military preparedness exercise on the Ukrainian borders at the height of Ukrainian crisis in late February 2014 (Myers, 2014) The idea that Russia should participate in the missile defence system and contribute to a pan-European device is often advanced by the defenders of the American proposal.
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It is also often accompanied by the idea that Russia should join NATO, which is presented as a panacea for all the security problems in Europe. In view of the history of relations between Russia and its NATO counterparts, it is hardly likely that the alliance along with its 1990s adaptations could be seen as more attractive to Russia now than before, considering Russia's global resurgence. On the contrary, Moscow is questioning this legacy of the 1990s and is seeking an appropriate role in the European security architecture. There are two opposing and contradictory stances being taken. On one side, Russia wishes to engage in a substantive discussion about the pertinence of NATO, in view of its belief that the alliance is erecting a new Berlin Wall (Putin, 2008) . On the other side, the West sees NATO as an entirely new organisation, which has adapted to the new geopolitical situation and is no longer a threat to Russia. The debate about missile defence obscures another (avoided) discussion about the fact that NATO could represent a bloc against other countries. At the very least, the two stances are evidence that Moscow has not been offered a satisfying role in the organisation, which it permanently perceived as a threat or at least a leverage that could be used against its interests.
The main questions raised in the debate about the necessity of a missile defence system in Europe fall into two categories: political and technical arguments are used to defend or attack the project.
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From a technical point of view, the feasibility and effectiveness of such a device is questioned, as is the proven existence of a threat posed by an eventual Iranian nuclear bomb. From a political point of view, the risks of proliferation and arms race are discussed, as is the real purpose of the extension of the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system in Europe as opposed to the stated goal of dissuading against Iran. Whether Europe needs such a system, against whom might it be directed and the consequences for arms proliferation are critical questions to be considered.
In the transition from President Vladimir Putin to successor Dmitry Medvedev (2008 -2012 , there has been continuity concerning the stance on missile defence in Europe, because the new President erected a diplomatic fence around this issue. In June 2008, in his first visit to a Western country (Germany), Medvedev underlined two 8 Interviews at NATO headquarters in Brussels, on March 12, 2008 and on February 24, 2009. 9 See for instance Slocombe et al. (2007) , Webb (2008) , Muller (2007) and Krause (2007) . leitmotivs for Russian foreign policy. First, NATO enlargement would seriously damage relations with Russia; second, the transatlantic approach is no longer suited to address security challenges in Europe. He proposed the creation of a "European security pact" that would link all the parties involved. He summarised the main idea of renewing the existing security architecture and mentioned the need for a "breathing space", namely to discuss Kosovo and the missile defence system (Medvedev, 2008) . Indirectly, President Medvedev urged a reshaping of the existing dialogue but without enlarging NATO and with Russia taking on a new role. This is the first time such a proposal has been advanced and defended, in an elaborated and more gentle tone although it remained so far a rhetorical exercise.
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The escalation of the Ukrainian crisis since the end of 2013 further narrows any prospects for this proposal to be taken more seriously.
Russia challenges, thus, the current alliance and its role in Europe. Missile defence is therefore not an isolated, controversial question and it should be understood in a broader geostrategic panorama, where the actors (particularly Russia) link different issues as a means to achieve goals. In the case of Russia, recovering from the humiliation of the Yeltsin years is an important factor. Yet, the issue of security at its borders is more consistent and goes beyond political post-imperial symbolism. The approach of sovereignty through territorial control has unique features in Russian foreign policy that are explained by the eurasianist imperial characteristics of Russia (Chaudet et al., 2009: 39-66; 99-120) . The August war in Georgia in 2008 and the ongoing Ukrainian split have proved that the Kremlin uses its strategic assets to reassert its role in the "near abroad". Russia" (Osipovich, 2008) . While still president, Putin voiced the same idea when he threatened to target missiles in Ukraine, should it join the alliance (Belton, 2008) . For the Kremlin, these two issues are closely linked to the equilibrium of forces in Europe.
The French and German caution at the Bucharest summit, delaying the NATO Membership Action Plans for Georgia and Ukraine, arguably reflected the desire to preserve relations with Moscow.
These events also demonstrate that this third post-cold war enlargement differs from the previous ones of 1999 and 2004. Russia is now able to reject the status quo it had previously accepted because its position in the balance of power has changed. This objection constituted a strong signal that Russia could influence outcomes and that the "common neighbourhood" Prime Minister explained that France was against this accession because it was not "the right answer to the equilibrium, to the relations of power in Europe and to the relations between Europe and Russia" (Zecchini, 2008) . He was actually expressing a view held by some EU and NATO member states, and he committed a media blunder because he was accepting implicitly that there are still spheres of influence in Europe.
Another important item in the US-Russian dialogue was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1993 (START II) of 1993, which has not been implemented because Russia withdrew from it immediately after Washington withdrew from the ABM Treaty, as above mentioned. This agreement is especially relevant because it prohibited intercontinental missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRVed ICBMs).
This kind of missiles change the capacity to deter and to deliver a first strike, since the capability for destruction is increased by the multiple warheads carried by a single missile. The theory of nuclear deterrence is based on the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) principle. 15 The 30 parties in the 1999 CFE Treaty are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK and the US. There is little doubt that missile defence in Europe would alter the existing equilibrium and the deterrence capacities. According to Webb (2008) , it would undermine diplomacy and multilateral arms control in favour of a unilateral use of force, as in Iraq. The American agenda of missile defence "does not fit with the cooperative security model that Europeans support" (ibidem). Arms proliferation is also a risk pointed out by the opponents of the system. But for the US, it would improve its capacity to deter an eventual attack from Iran or North Korea. Once more, two conflicting views emerge. On the one hand, one can argue that the missile defence would represent a deterrent, avoiding the risk of an attack or the determination to develop nuclear weapons.
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On the other hand, one can argue that a vicious circle would emerge (similar to the arms race of the cold war) and alternative weaponry would be developed to counter the deterrence effect of the missile shield. The fact that Russia has "continued apace with its massive military rejuvenation efforts" during 2013 (IHS Jane's Defense Weekly, 2014) and has been engaging in a military build-up is already seen as a sign in that sense (Muller, 2007) Russia ranks first among non-EU countries undertaking the greatest number of meetings with the EU, at all levels. It is also a special NATO partner. Nevertheless, there is a vacuum in the existing European security architecture, which fails to link the several multilateral and bilateral forums on missile defence and other related issues.
16 Thränert (Slocombe et al., 2007) develops a refined argument about the deterrence effect of the missile defence, notably as a tool for crisis management. It is also interesting to note a Russian argument on the matter of deterrence, being that Moscow's assistance to Iran in the development of civil nuclear technology helps non-proliferation, as Russian control of the production process and recovery of the wasted fuel prevents its use for military purposes.
The fact that two EU member states are involved in the Russian dispute with Washington to install the missile defence system further complicates matters. This is a particularly sensitive issue, since Russia has been seeking closer cooperation with the EU in defence since 1999 (Fernandes, 2009) . Moscow feels that the EU has not reciprocated and it would consider greater EU involvement in European security a way of provoking a reassessment of the role of the US in the European security architecture.
GAINING STRATEGIC RELEVANCE THROUGH AN ECONOMIC ASSET
"Energy represents a source of control for those capable of accessing and selling it, a security issue for both suppliers and buyers, and a foreign policy tool wielded by state actors" (Hadfield, 2008: 321) . The energy agenda has been highlighted since 2006 because Russia seeks the recuperation of the energetic incomes and its distribution.
Energy is one of the most prominent topics in the relationship with the EU, negotiated in their trade and investment agenda. Russia is the world largest exporter of gas and the second largest oil exporter, with considerable reserves of both hydrocarbons but also of coal. The country has the world's largest natural gas reserves and is the third largest consumer of energy (EIA, 2008) . The EU is the main trading partner of Russia, the latter being the third largest trading partner of the Union, largely due to the purchase of gas. In 2012, Brussels depended on 23% of Russian gas, with only 33% of consumption guaranteed internally 82% of the gas consumed was routed by pipeline, mainly sourced and controlled by Russian interests (Eurogas, 2014).
In 2000, the EU and Russia were already engaged in an energy dialogue.
However, the lack of ratification of the 1994 Energy Charter by the Russian Federation has been a recurrent problem between the two parties. The Charter and related documents rule energy relations based, namely, on free access to energy markets; free transit of energy products; and free flow of investment capital in energy. Putin, as prime minister, closed definitely the issue of ratification when he notified foreign governments that Russia would not join the Charter (Ria Novosti, 2009 ). The main consequence of this fact is that there is no mutual access to energy markets and Gazprom 17 retains its monopoly, namely of access to its pipelines for natural gas transit from Central Asia to the European Union. The parties disagree on the necessity to adopt a new treaty.
As a consequence of the deterioration of energy relations since the first gas crisis of 2006 that disrupted gas deliveries towards Europe, the parties agreed to create an early warning mechanism to prevent energy disruptions. It refers not only to equal access but also to exploitation deals. Energy has also been highlighted since 2006 because Russia seeks to recoup the income from energy production and distribution, which was partly managed by foreign companies (Putin, 2008) .
Besides the Russian non-application of the ECT, the fact that the EU has no integrated policy on energy yet puts a break on its management of the issue, as opposed to bilateral relations of member states with Moscow. The pipeline routes intersect the political dependencies: the EU wants as much as Russia more autonomy in relation to the transit countries. Gazprom needs to rely on other sources of supply in order to fulfil the contracts with its final consumers mainly in terms of volume of gas. On its side, the EU is exploring ways of changing this situation by dealing directly with the Central Asian Republics. Both parties have preferred, then, to explore alternatives in friendly countries (diversification) and bilateral agreements of member states with Moscow have been undermining the prospects for a coherent and integrated energy policy at the EU level. France, Germany and Italy have signed agreements with Gazprom that involve for instance two new pipelines ("Nordstream" and "Southstream") and opened distribution market for Gazprom in exchange of guaranteed supplies, with the support of new member states such as Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia (CASE, 2008: 198-199; Eke, 2009 ; Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2010). The aim is to create direct connections with the final consumers in Western Europe and, as a consequence, avoiding the transit countries in Central Europe (Mongrenier, 2009: 142-143 ).
As Delcour and Verluise (2009) emphasise, Brussels and Moscow have taken divergent approaches since 2006. The Union pursues the goal of a market-ruled and transparent energy sector, whereas Russia seeks to protect a strategic sector for the development of the Federation. Individually, some member states have preferred to secure their levels of consumption and downgrade relations between Russia and the European Commission to technical issues, thus, supporting Russia's goals. To face this situation, the EU needs both to find alternative suppliers but also alternative pipeline routes that bypass Russian territory, besides the need to agree on a common policy. The difficulty to concretise these combined needs is illustrated by a Polish Member of the European Parliament's (MEP) sharp critic towards Italy. He considers that the Italian deal with Gazprom for the Southstream pipeline, above-mentioned, is a "sabotage" of the EU Nabucco project because it jeopardizes the key issue of access to Central Asian and Caspian reserves (Saryusz-Wolski, 2007) . Noël (2008: 3-7) does not foresee the scenario of a European gas market increasingly dominated by Russia provided that the creation of a single gas market would create solidarity among EU consumers and create a unified stance towards Russia.
BEYOND STRATEGIC INTERESTS: THE ROLE OF VALUES AND PRINCIPLES
The analysis above has highlighted that the irritants concerning the European security architecture are informed by competing strategic interests. Russian perceptions of its geopolitical relevance are challenged, both in the nuclear and conventional fields, by anti-missile systems projects and by the revised CFE. Additionally, diverging views challenge the core legitimacy of the role of NATO in Europe. Concerning energetic assets, gas has also been an instrument to foster Russian power position. In this section, we explore further the evolution of the increasingly difficult security relations of Multilateralism is a specific way of gathering international actors to support cooperation, non-discrimination principals, diffuse reciprocity (positive sum games) and generalised institutional structures. "Multilateralism" refers both to an organising principle and/or a specific international institution, which distinguishes itself by three properties: indivisibility; generalised principles of conduct; and diffuse reciprocity (Caporaso, 1992; Ruggie, 1992) . The literature of the beginning of the 1990s underlined the specificity of multilateralism but also the difficulty in defining it in a unique manner (meaning and concrete form). Multilateralism is an institution but it can refer to an organisation or an activity (Caporaso, 1992: 603) . Considering that multilateralism is a form of producing common norms, this section aims at analysing how multilateral relations affect political convergence between Russia and third parties.
THE EU AND RUSSIA
Our paper argues that the EU is a sui generis international organisation which conveys the practice of multilateral methods in its interactions with third parties. This characteristic is based on two core elements. Firstly, the external policy of the Union endorses values and principles that are deposited, namely, in the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, the Union seeks the promotion of "effective multilateralism".
The goal of the EU is to improve global governance and support, on the one hand, the UN system and, on the other hand, the EU values (European Commission, 2003a) .
The Union recognises the importance of multilateralism for its policies that have external dimensions in other documents, such as the European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003) . Secondly, we argue that the EU is itself a unique international organisation whose relations with Russia cannot be considered simply as bilateral relations as it is for instance the case of relations between two states. The EU pursues a regional process of integration since 1951 that has no precedent in history.
Today, the Union has no foreign policy as such, in the sense that it is a sui generis global actor (Cameron, 2007) . In fact, there are areas of community competence and others depend on intergovernmental decision-making, whereas others remain national a prerogative, outside European decision-making. This is a complex framework which involves several EU institutions (the Commission, the Council, the Presidency, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), member states and other international organisations.
The current literature also points to the fact that multilateralism is still defined in different ways, particularly in different regions of the world "but common to all are the importance of rules, institutionalised cooperation and inclusiveness." The EU has still to develop a "coherent doctrine of multilateralism", although it has been consistent in the promotion of principles to seek multilateral solutions (Mercury, 2010: 2) .In fact, since 1997, EU-Russia relations developed a sui generis framework of institutionalised cooperation, producing "rules" and "inclusiveness" in a broad range of domains from trade relations to educational cooperation.
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From the EU perspective, the purpose of the relationship with Moscow is to avoid new dividing lines in Europe after having overcome previous ones (bipolarity). One of the most visible strains in this relationship is the sharing of common values and principles, which are supposed to be the basis of 18 The EU-Russia cooperation outputs are described on the EU website and available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/. Building on Manners' (2004) study of the EU as a "normative power", Laïdi (2010) has been studying the issue of norms and the rejection of the use of force to impose norms by the EU. He attempts to classify the Union as a "Risk Averse Power". This kind of power insists on the "indivisibility of systemic risks between actors" and is determined to diminish the "risky behaviours" of other actors by integrating "their actions within a normative framework that would constrain them and make them more predictable" (2010: 2). We will not discuss here the feasibility of such a normative commitment for the EU as a global actor and the various understandings of the concept.
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We address here the effects of this assumption on its relationship with Russia, namely the convergence to the core systemic principles that it has endorsed in this context. The principled relationship aimed by the Union has proven to be difficult to achieve in the interaction with Russia. Contrarily, the use of conditionality (to link the relation to values observance) and the insistence on normative convergence has been producing increasingly a negative impact on the Union because Russia has been reacting negatively (Makarychev, 2008) . As a result, this relationship has reached a paradoxical stage. On the one hand, the methodology and the domains of cooperation have reached a high degree of achievements. On the other hand, the political quality of the relation has deteriorated and it has been unable to achieve a real strategic partnership, as the handling of Georgian and Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated.
Despite the fact that there are a lot of statements in that sense, the EU has not been willing to go beyond normative rhetoric on Russia. The most visible issue is the Chechen conflict that Russians always consider as an internal affair, refusing international interference (Carrère d'Encausse, 2010: 67-73) . The EU has also never withdrawn from the vision that Russia is a partner, despite the existing normative gap.
Even in the peaks of crisis in the relation, president Putin has been received by the EU as a special guest (for instance, during the Lahti informal Summit, in October 2006 under Finnish Presidency). The EU has created a specific dialogue on Human Rights with Russia, since March 2005, but the consultations never took place in Russia and it looks more as an additional, repetitive and somewhat empty institutional mechanism.
Until the mid-2000s, there has been some wishful thinking on the European side that these talks could lately produce the desired effect on Russian transformation.
Since
Putin's third re-election in 2012, the Russian course of reassertion and politicalnormative divergences creates growing outstanding issues in the relationship in the four common spaces of cooperation.
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The Ukrainian crisis has contributed to deepen further this state-of-play by evidencing different normative understandings about sovereignty and territorial integrity on both sides. Additionally, the EU political system also contributes to the difficulty in creating political convergence between the EU and Russia because individual member states' views on Russia are able to create competitive aims that are not convergent with the EU's normative agenda. 
A SYSTEM OF NORMATIVE COMMITMENTS IN OTHER MULTILATERAL CONTEXTS
In this section, we analyse the role that international organisations and conventions have played, during Putin's mandates, in enhancing the normative gap between Moscow and European counterparts. Besides the EU-Russia institutionalized framework, the EU specifically binds its relationship with Moscow to the provisions that both parties endorsed in other multilateral organisations or conventions. Among the most important references, the United Nations Charter, the OSCE and the Council of Europe are core depositaries of principles and values. In the economic realm, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the depositary of these principles. The Union, its member states, and Russia are connected to these multilateral forums, as members or observers. We observe that the Russian Federation has been using these multilateral arenas to discard difficult subjects or binding commitments from the EU-Russian agenda and depoliticise cooperation items. Nonetheless, the issues that Russia has to deal with in other fora than the EU show, as we shall see below, that Moscow tries not to be scrutinised in any multilateral relationship, neither in the relationship with the Union, nor with other international organisations.
The fact that Russia is a member state of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OSCE has created a normative commitment towards these organisations and its members. Criticism against Russia has arisen in this context because the country is considered to have failed to respect original commitments. Commission acknowledges that "the interpretation of reciprocity which should characterise interdependence differs widely". As a consequence, "the EU's dependence on Russia as a[n energy] supplier will remain strong and might be a source of concern" (ibidem: 7). On human rights, the review considers that " [t] here is a general sense that there is a growing gap with regard to common commitments in the Council of Europe and the OSCE" (ibidem: 3) and that "some gap exists between declarations and expressions of intent and reality on the ground" (ibidem: 8). Trofimov (Massias, 2007: 115-116 ). Massias concludes that the existence of two different conceptions of democracy and its principles hinders the credibility of the Council of Europe (ibidem: 118). This divergence produces a dilemma between, on the one hand, the need not to exclude Russia and, on the other hand, the consideration of its devious human rights and democratic records. As it is the case in EU-Russian relations, the relations of the Council of Europe with Moscow have proven to need a rethinking. The author interprets the Russian view on its membership as follows:
Russia's involvement must be understood as reflecting its overarching desire for multilateral diplomacy.
[…] The [Council of Europe] , therefore, is part of Moscow's search for recognition and international respectability […] For Russia is very self-conscious of its image abroad: while using multilateral fora to alter its partners' evaluation criteria, it is always asserting its specificity. (Massias, 2007: 115) An EU official of the Council Secretariat 26 perceives that the Council of Europe is an exception in Russian views on multilateral fora. He considers that Russia is more "sentimental" about this organisation, as opposed to other fora where Russia does not believe in multilateralism and defends its own national positions. Nonetheless, Russian leaders are defensive and perceive these organisations as ways of influencing and tend to avoid decisions that could be prejudicial for their country. Membership is seen, mainly, as a gain in influence.
Similarly, commitments concerning the OSCE are perceived by Moscow as being relative and subject to change. In this organisation, the mutual criticisms have materialised mainly about the role of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) and the CFE Treaty. Putin's Russia is criticised for its attempts to limit the scope of action of the organisation. The Russian argument is that the OSCE is too politicised and applies double standards (Jégo, 2007) Russia's positions demonstrate, thus, that European geopolitics is informed by competing views and a lack of political convergence about the foundations of the dialogues. These divergences go beyond core and classic issues of sovereignty
